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McAfee: All Results Tactic Page Information

The ATT&CK All Results page displays the procedures, tested techniques, and detection results for all steps in an evaluation. The Procedure column contains a description of how the technique in the corresponding technique column was tested. The Step column is where in the operational flow the procedure occurred. Click the Step Number to view it in the Operational Flow panel. Detections are classified by one or more Detection Types, summarized by the Detection Notes, and may be supported by Screenshots. The Operational Flow panel provides the context around when a procedure was executed by showing all steps of the evaluation, including the tactics, techniques and procedures of the executed steps.

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Overview Matrix JSON Legend
Legend
Main Detection Categories: Detection Modifiers:

None

Telemetry

Indicator of
Compromise

General
Behavior

MSSP

General

Tactic

Specific
Behavior

Technique

Enrichment

Tainted

Alert

Correlated

Delayed

Host
Interrogation

Residual
Artifact

Configuration
Change

Innovative
Step
Procedures Criteria
Technique
Detection Type Detection Notes
1.A.1
User Pam executed payload rcs.3aka3.doc The rcs.3aka3.doc process spawning from explorer.exe
User Execution
(T1204)
General (Alert)
A General alert detection (red indicator) called "Running Process(es) with suspicious name" was generated for the execution of a process with a suspicious name. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed explorer.exe executing rcs.3aka3.doc. [1] [2]
1.A.2
Used unicode right-to-left override (RTLO) character to obfuscate file name rcs.3aka3.doc (originally cod.3aka.scr) Evidence of the right-to-left override character (U+202E) in the rcs.3aka.doc process ​OR the original filename (cod.3aka.scr)
Masquerading
(T1036)
Technique (Configuration Change (Detections), Alert)
A Technique alert detection (red indicator) called "Masquerading" was generated due to the Suspicious Indicator "Executed process with left to right character override." The vendor added a new detection for the technique. [1]
1.A.3
Established C2 channel (192.168.0.5) via rcs.3aka3.doc payload over TCP port 1234 Established network channel over port 1234
Uncommonly Used Port
(T1065)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (blue indicator) called "Commonly Used Port" showed rcs.3aka3.doc connecting to 192.168.0.5 on TCP port 1234. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed rcs.3aka3.doc process connecting to 192.168.0.5 on TCP port 1234. [1]
1.A.4
Used RC4 stream cipher to encrypt C2 (192.168.0.5) traffic Evidence that the network data sent over the C2 channel is encrypted
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
(T1032)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
1.B.1
Spawned interactive cmd.exe cmd.exe spawning from the rcs.3aka3.doc​ process
Command-Line Interface
(T1059)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed rcs.3aka3.doc spawning cmd.exe. The telemetry was correlated to a parent alert for rcs.3aka3.doc spawning cmd.exe. [1] [2] [3]
1.B.2
Spawned interactive powershell.exe powershell.exe spawning from cmd.exe
PowerShell
(T1086)
Technique (Alert, Correlated)
A Technique alert detection (blue indicator) called "PowerShell" was generated due to the PowerShell command being executed from another process. The technique was correlated to a parent alert for rcs.3aka3.doc spawning cmd.exe. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed cmd.exe launching powershell.exe. The telemetry was correlated to a parent alert for rcs.3aka3.doc spawning cmd.exe. [1]
2.A.1
Searched filesystem for document and media files using PowerShell  powershell.exe executing (Get-)ChildItem
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
2.A.2
Scripted search of filesystem for document and media files using PowerShell  powershell.exe executing (Get-)ChildItem
Automated Collection
(T1119)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
2.A.3
Recursively collected files found in C:\Users\Pam\ using PowerShell powershell.exe reading files in C:\Users\Pam\
Data from Local System
(T1005)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
2.A.4
Compressed and stored files into ZIP (Draft.zip) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Compress-Archive
Data Compressed
(T1002)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
2.A.5
Staged files for exfiltration into ZIP (Draft.zip) using PowerShell powershell.exe creating the file draft.zip
Data Staged
(T1074)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the creation of Draft.Zip. [1]
2.B.1
Read and downloaded ZIP (Draft.zip) over C2 channel (192.168.0.5 over TCP port 1234) The rcs.3aka3.doc process reading the file draft.zip while connected to the C2 channel
Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel
(T1041)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
3.A.1
Dropped stage 2 payload (monkey.png) to disk The rcs.3aka3.doc process creating the file monkey.png
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed rcs.3aka3.doc creating monkey.png. [1]
3.A.2
Embedded PowerShell payload in monkey.png using steganography Evidence that a PowerShell payload was within monkey.png
Obfuscated Files or Information
(T1027)
Technique (Configuration Change (Detections), Alert)
A Technique alert detection (orange indicator) called "Data Obfuscation" was generated due to the Suspicious Indicator "Script hidden in bitmap file executed through Powershell..." [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed PowerShell extracting and executing the code embedded within monkey.png. The telemetry was correlated to a parent alert for rcs.3aka3.doc spawning cmd.exe. [1]
3.B.1
Modified the Registry to enable COM hijacking of sdclt.exe using PowerShell Addition of the DelegateExecute ​subkey in ​HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\​​command​​
Component Object Model Hijacking
(T1122)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the addition of the DelegateExecute Registry Value. [1]
3.B.2
Executed elevated PowerShell payload High integrity powershell.exe spawning from control.exe​​ (spawned from sdclt.exe)
Bypass User Account Control
(T1088)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed control.exe creating a high integrity powershell.exe. MVISION Endpoint would have blocked this step due to a signature-based detection for code being executed in a PowerShell session. [1] [2]
3.B.3
Established C2 channel (192.168.0.5) via PowerShell payload over TCP port 443 Established network channel over port 443
Commonly Used Port
(T1043)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe connecting to 192.168.0.5 on TCP port 443. [1] [2]
3.B.4
Used HTTPS to transport C2 (192.168.0.5) traffic Evidence that the network data sent over the C2 channel is HTTPS
Standard Application Layer Protocol
(T1071)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
3.B.5
Used HTTPS to encrypt C2 (192.168.0.5) traffic Evidence that the network data sent over the C2 channel is encrypted
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
(T1032)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
3.C.1
Modified the Registry to remove artifacts of COM hijacking Deletion of of the HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\Open\command subkey
Modify Registry
(T1112)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.A.1
Dropped additional tools (SysinternalsSuite.zip) to disk over C2 channel (192.168.0.5) powershell.exe creating the file SysinternalsSuite.zip
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the file write of the ZIP by PowerShell. [1]
4.A.2
Spawned interactive powershell.exe powershell.exe spawning from powershell.exe
PowerShell
(T1086)
Technique
A Technique detection called "PowerShell" was generated due to PowerShell being executed by another script. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed a new powershell.exe spawning from powershell.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for PowerShell. [1] [2]
4.A.3
Decompressed ZIP (SysinternalsSuite.zip) file using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Expand-Archive
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
(T1140)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed PowerShell writing the files that were decompressed from the ZIP. [1]
4.B.1
Enumerated current running processes using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-Process
Process Discovery
(T1057)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.B.2
Deleted rcs.3aka3.doc on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file rcs.3aka3.doc
File Deletion
(T1107)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow indicator) called "File Deletion" was generated due to sdelete64.exe deleting rcs.3aka3.doc. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed sdelete.exe running with command-line arguments to delete the file. [1]
4.B.3
Deleted Draft.zip on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file draft.zip
File Deletion
(T1107)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow indicator) called "File Deletion" was generated due to sdelete64.exe deleting Draft.Zip. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed sdelete.exe running with command-line arguments to delete the file. [1]
4.B.4
Deleted SysinternalsSuite.zip on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file SysinternalsSuite.zip
File Deletion
(T1107)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow indicator) called "File Deletion" was generated due to sdelete64.exe deleting SysinterlsSuite.zip. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed sdelete.exe running with command-line arguments to delete the file. [1]
4.C.1
Enumerated user's temporary directory path using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:TEMP
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
4.C.2
Enumerated the current username using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:USERNAME
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
4.C.3
Enumerated the computer hostname using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:COMPUTERNAME
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
4.C.4
Enumerated the current domain name using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:USERDOMAIN
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
4.C.5
Enumerated the current process ID using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $PID
Process Discovery
(T1057)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
4.C.6
Enumerated the OS version using PowerShell powershell.exe executing​ Gwmi Win32_OperatingSystem
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
4.C.7
Enumerated anti-virus software using PowerShell powershell.exe executing​ Get-WmiObject ...​ -Class AntiVirusProduct
Security Software Discovery
(T1063)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
4.C.8
Enumerated firewall software using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-WmiObject ...​​ -Class FireWallProduct
Security Software Discovery
(T1063)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
4.C.9
Enumerated user's domain group membership via the NetUserGetGroups API powershell.exe executing the NetUserGetGroups API
Permission Groups Discovery
(T1069)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
4.C.10
Executed API call by reflectively loading Netapi32.dll The NetUserGetGroups API function loaded into powershell.exe from Netapi32.dll
Execution through API
(T1106)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
4.C.11
Enumerated user's local group membership via the NetUserGetLocalGroups API powershell.exe executing the NetUserGetLocalGroups API
Permission Groups Discovery
(T1069)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
4.C.12
Executed API call by reflectively loading Netapi32.dll The NetUserGetLocalGroups API function loaded into powershelle.exe from Netapi32.dll
Execution through API
(T1106)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
5.A.1
Created a new service (javamtsup) that executes a service binary (javamtsup.exe) at system startup powershell.exe creating the Javamtsup service
New Service
(T1050)
General
A General detection was generated for a service "never seen in the baseline of the company." [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the creation of javamtsup service. [1] [2]
5.B.1
Created a LNK file (hostui.lnk) in the Startup folder that executes on login powershell.exe creating the file hostui.lnk in the Startup folder
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
(T1060)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow indicator) called "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder" was generated due to an application being set to run when Windows starts. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed the creation of hostui.lnk in the Startup folder. The event was correlated to a parent alert for a suspicious PowerShell. [1]
6.A.1
Read the Chrome SQL database file to extract encrypted credentials accesschk.exe reading files within %APPDATALOCAL%\Google\chrome\user data\default\
Credentials in Files
(T1081)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
6.A.2
Executed the CryptUnprotectedData API call to decrypt Chrome passwords accesschk.exe executing the CryptUnprotectedData API
Credential Dumping
(T1003)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
6.A.3
Masqueraded a Chrome password dump tool as accesscheck.exe, a legitimate Sysinternals tool Evidence that accesschk.exe is not the legitimate Sysinternals tool
Masquerading
(T1036)
General (Delayed (Manual))
A General detection was generated for "Malicious file(s) reputation report(s)" on accesschk.exe. Since the investigation was manually started, delaying the detection, it is identified as Delayed (Manual). [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the hash of accesschk.exe which can be used to verify it is not the legitimate Sysinternals tool. [1]
6.B.1
Exported a local certificate to a PFX file using PowerShell powershell.exe creating a certificate file exported from the system
Private Keys
(T1145)
Technique (Configuration Change (Detections), Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow indicator) called "Private Keys" was generated due to Suspicious Indicator "A new Private Key file with pfx/p12 extension was created." [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed file create event for a $RandomFileName.pfx file by powershell.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for PowerShell. [1]
6.C.1
Dumped password hashes from the Windows Registry by injecting a malicious DLL into Lsass.exe powershell.exe injecting into lsass.exe OR lsass.exe reading Registry keys under HKLM:\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\
Credential Dumping
(T1003)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow indicator) called "Credential Dumping" was generated due to Suspicious Indicator "LSASS process memory read by another process." [1]
7.A.1
Captured and saved screenshots using PowerShell powershell.exe executing the CopyFromScreen function from System.Drawing.dll
Screen Capture
(T1113)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. MVISION Endpoint would have blocked this activity.
7.A.2
Captured clipboard contents using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-Clipboard
Clipboard Data
(T1115)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
7.A.3
Captured user keystrokes using the GetAsyncKeyState API powershell.exe executing the GetAsyncKeyState API
Input Capture
(T1056)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow indicator) called "Input Capture" was generated due to PowerShell key logging module activity. [1]
7.B.1
Read data in the user's Downloads directory using PowerShell powershell.exe reading files in C:\Users\pam\Downloads\
Data from Local System
(T1005)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
7.B.2
Compressed data from the user's Downloads directory into a ZIP file (OfficeSupplies.7z) using PowerShell powershell.exe creating the file OfficeSupplies.7z
Data Compressed
(T1002)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the file create event for OfficeSupplies.7z. [1]
7.B.3
Encrypted data from the user's Downloads directory using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Compress-7Zip with the password argument used for encryption
Data Encrypted
(T1022)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure though script block log were manually recovered from the system, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
7.B.4
Exfiltrated collection (OfficeSupplies.7z) to WebDAV network share using PowerShell powershell executing Copy-Item pointing to an attack-controlled WebDav network share (192.168.0.4:80)
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
(T1048)
General (Alert, Configuration Change (Detections))
A General alert detection (low severity) was generated due to rundll32.exe connecting to 192.168.0.4 via WebDav. The vendor added a new detection for the technique. [1]
8.A.1
Enumerated remote systems using LDAP queries powershell.exe making LDAP queries over port 389 to the Domain Controller (10.0.0.4)
Remote System Discovery
(T1018)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe establishing a connection to NewYork (10.0.0.4) over TCP port 389. [1] [2]
8.A.2
Established WinRM connection to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) Network connection to Scranton (10.0.1.4) over port 5985
Windows Remote Management
(T1028)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed a connection to Scranton (10.0.1.4) on port 5985. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for PowerShell. [1]
8.A.3
Enumerated processes on remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-Process
Process Discovery
(T1057)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
8.B.1
Copied python.exe payload from a WebDAV share (192.168.0.4) to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) The file python.exe created on Scranton (10.0.1.4)
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the file create event of python.exe. [1]
8.B.2
python.exe payload was packed with UPX Evidence that the file python.exe is packed
Software Packing
(T1045)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
8.C.1
Logged on to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) using valid credentials for user Pam Successful logon as user Pam on Scranton (10.0.1.4)
Valid Accounts
(T1078)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a valid logon on Scranton (10.0.1.4) as user Pam. [1]
8.C.2
Established SMB session to remote host Scranton's (10.0.1.4) IPC$ share using PsExec SMB session to Scanton (10.0.1.4) over TCP port 445/135 OR evidence of usage of a Windows share
Windows Admin Shares
(T1077)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed an SMB session from Nashua (10.0.1.6) to Scranton (10.0.1.4) over TCP port 135. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for PowerShell. [1]
8.C.3
Executed python.exe using PSExec python.exe spawned by PSEXESVC.exe
Service Execution
(T1035)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed python.exe spawned by PSEXESVC.exe. The malicious Python process would have been blocked by MVISION Endpoint by a Real Protect machine learning model based on process behavior. [1]
9.A.1
Dropped rar.exe to disk on remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4)  python.exe creating the file rar.exe
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a file created event for rar.exe. [1]
9.A.2
Dropped sdelete.exe to disk on remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4)  python.exe creating the file sdelete64.exe
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed File Created event for sdelete64.exe. [1]
9.B.1
Spawned interactive powershell.exe powershell.exe​ spawning from python.exe
PowerShell
(T1086)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed python.exe executing powershell.exe. [1]
9.B.2
Searched filesystem for document and media files using PowerShell powershell.exe executing (Get-)ChildItem​
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
9.B.3
Scripted search of filesystem for document and media files using PowerShell  powershell.exe executing (Get-)ChildItem​
Automated Collection
(T1119)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
9.B.4
Recursively collected files found in C:\Users\Pam\ using PowerShell powershell.exe reading files in C:\Users\Pam\
Data from Local System
(T1005)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
9.B.5
Staged files for exfiltration into ZIP (working.zip in AppData directory) using PowerShell powershell.exe creating the file working.zip
Data Staged
(T1074)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed a File Created event for powershell.exe creating working.zip. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for PowerShell. [1]
9.B.6
Encrypted staged ZIP (working.zip in AppData directory) into working.zip (on Desktop) using rar.exe powershell.exe executing rar.exe with the -a parameter for a password to use for encryption
Data Encrypted
(T1022)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing rar.exe with command-line arguments. [1]
9.B.7
Compressed staged ZIP (working.zip in AppData directory) into working.zip (on Desktop) using rar.exe powershell.exe executing rar.exe
Data Compressed
(T1002)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing rar.exe with command-line arguments. [1]
9.B.8
Read and downloaded ZIP (working.zip on Desktop) over C2 channel (192.168.0.5 over TCP port 8443) python.exe reading the file working.zip while connected to the C2 channel
Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel
(T1041)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
9.C.1
Deleted rar.exe on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file rar.exe
File Deletion
(T1107)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow indicator) called "File Deletion" was generated when sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments was used to delete rar.exe. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments to delete rar.exe. The event was correlated to a parent alerts of a suspicious python.exe process. [1]
9.C.2
Deleted working.zip (from Desktop) on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file \Desktop\working.zip
File Deletion
(T1107)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow indicator) called "File Deletion" was generated when sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments was used to delete Desktop\working.zip. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments to delete Desktop\working.zip. The event was correlated to a parent alerts of a suspicious python.exe process. [1]
9.C.3
Deleted working.zip (from AppData directory) on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file \AppData\Roaming\working.zip
File Deletion
(T1107)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow indicator) called "File Deletion" was generated when sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments was used to delete Roaming\working.zip. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments to delete Roaming\working.zip. The event was correlated to a parent alerts of a suspicious python.exe process. [1]
9.C.4
Deleted SDelete on disk using cmd.exe del command cmd.exe deleting the file sdelete64.exe
File Deletion
(T1107)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed deletion of sdelete64.exe. The event was correlated to a parent alerts of a suspicious python.exe process. [1]
10.A.1
Executed persistent service (javamtsup) on system startup javamtsup.exe spawning from services.exe
Service Execution
(T1035)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
10.B.1
Executed LNK payload (hostui.lnk) in Startup Folder on user login Evidence that the file hostui.lnk (which executes hostui.bat as a byproduct) was executed from the Startup Folder
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
(T1060)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
10.B.2
Executed PowerShell payload via the CreateProcessWithToken API hostui.exe executing the CreateProcessWithToken API
Execution through API
(T1106)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though data showed svchost.exe with -seclogon flag spawning before PowerShell. MVISION Endpoint would have blocked this activity. [1] [2]
10.B.3
Manipulated the token of the PowerShell payload via the CreateProcessWithToken API hostui.exe manipulating the token of powershell.exe via the CreateProcessWithToken API OR powershell.exe executing with the stolen token of explorer.exe
Access Token Manipulation
(T1134)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
11.A.1
User Oscar executed payload 37486-the-shocking-truth-about-election-rigging-in-america.rtf.lnk powershell.exe spawning from explorer.exe
User Execution
(T1204)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed explorer.exe executing powershell.exe. [1]
11.A.2
Executed an alternate data stream (ADS) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing the schemas ADS via Get-Content and IEX
NTFS File Attributes
(T1096)
Technique (Configuration Change (Detections))
A Technique detection called "NTFS File Attributes" was generated due to execution of schemas ADS by powershell.exe. The vendor added a new detection for the technique. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing the schemas ADS with Get-Content and IEX. [1]
11.A.3
Checked that the BIOS version and serial number are not associated with VirtualBox or VMware using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_BIOS
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
(T1497)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
11.A.4
Enumerated computer manufacturer, model, and version information using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject gwmi queries for Win32_BIOS and Win32_ComputerSystem
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
11.A.5
Enumerated devices/adapters to check for presence of VirtualBox driver(s) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_PnPEntity
Peripheral Device Discovery
(T1120)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
11.A.6
Checked that the username is not related to admin or a generic value (ex: user) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_ComputerSystem
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
11.A.7
Checked that the computer is joined to a domain using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_ComputerSystem
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
11.A.8
Checked that processes such as procexp.exe, taskmgr.exe, or wireshark.exe are not running using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_Process
Process Discovery
(T1057)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. [1]
11.A.9
Checked that the payload is not inside a folder path that contains "sample" or is the length of a hash value using PowerShell powershell.exe executing (Get-Item -Path ".\" -Verbose).FullName
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
11.A.10
Decoded an embedded DLL payload to disk using certutil.exe certutil.exe decoding kxwn.lock
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
(T1140)
Technique (Configuration Change (Detections))
A Technique detection was generated for a file being decoded via certutil. The vendor added a new detection for the technique. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the certutil.exe process and corresponding file write of the kxwn.lock payload. MVISION Endpoint would have blocked this activity due to an Adaptive Threat Protection signature for execution of certutil.exe. [1]
11.A.11
Established Registry Run key persistence using PowerShell Addition of the Webcache subkey in HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
(T1060)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
11.A.12
Executed PowerShell stager payload powershell.exe spawning from from the schemas ADS (powershell.exe)
PowerShell
(T1086)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow indicator) called "PowerShell" was generated for powershell.exe spawned from a PowerShell stager. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe spawned from a PowerShell stager. Though no image was captured, MITRE confirmed that the vendor has the capability to show available telemetry in a separate view.
11.A.13
Established C2 channel (192.168.0.4) via PowerShell payload over port 443 Established network channel over port 443
Commonly Used Port
(T1043)
General
A General detection was generated identifying a socket opened by a process that normally does not.
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe making a network connection to the C2 (192.168.0.4) over TCP port 443. [1] [2]
11.A.14
Used HTTPS to transport C2 (192.168.0.4) traffic Established network channel over the HTTPS protocol
Standard Application Layer Protocol
(T1071)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. Although telemetry showed a network connection over port 443 no protocol was identified for this traffic, so a detection does not apply.
11.A.15
Used HTTPS to encrypt C2 (192.168.0.4) traffic Evidence that the network data sent over the C2 channel is encrypted
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
(T1032)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure. Although telemetry showed a network connection over port 443 no protocol was identified for this traffic, so a detection does not apply.
12.A.1
Enumerated the System32 directory using PowerShell powershell.exe executing (gci ((gci env:windir).Value + '\system32')
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
12.A.2
Modified the time attributes of the kxwn.lock persistence payload using PowerShell powershell.exe modifying the creation, last access, and last write times of kxwn.lock
Timestomp
(T1099)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
12.B.1
Enumerated registered AV products using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for AntiVirusProduct
Security Software Discovery
(T1063)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
12.C.1
Enumerated installed software via the Registry (Wow6432 Uninstall key) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Registry query for HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall
Query Registry
(T1012)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
12.C.2
Enumerated installed software via the Registry (Uninstall key) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Registry query for HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall
Query Registry
(T1012)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
13.A.1
Enumerated the computer name using the GetComputerNameEx API powershell.exe executing the GetComputerNameEx API
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
13.B.1
Enumerated the domain name using the NetWkstaGetInfo API powershell.exe executing the NetWkstaGetInfo API
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
13.C.1
Enumerated the current username using the GetUserNameEx API powershell.exe executing the GetUserNameEx API
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
13.D.1
Enumerated running processes using the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot API powershell.exe executing the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot API
Process Discovery
(T1057)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
14.A.1
Modified the Registry to enable COM hijacking of sdclt.exe using PowerShell Addition of the DelegateExecute subkey in HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command
Component Object Model Hijacking
(T1122)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the addition of the DelegateExecute Registry value. [1]
14.A.2
Executed elevated PowerShell payload High integrity powrshell.exe spawning from control.exe​​ (spawned from sdclt.exe)
Bypass User Account Control
(T1088)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a new High Integrity PowerShell callback spawned from control.exe (spawned from sdclt.exe). MVISION Endpoint would have blocked the malicious script from running in the PowerShell session due to a Real Protect machine learning model detection. [1]
14.A.3
Modified the Registry to remove artifacts of COM hijacking using PowerShell Deletion of the HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\Open\command subkey
Modify Registry
(T1112)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
14.B.1
Created and executed a WMI class using PowerShell WMI Process (WmiPrvSE.exe) executing powershell.exe
Windows Management Instrumentation
(T1047)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed WmiPrvSE.exe executing powershell.exe. [1]
14.B.2
Enumerated and tracked PowerShell processes using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-Process
Process Discovery
(T1057)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
14.B.3
Downloaded and dropped Mimikatz (m.exe) to disk powershell.exe downloading and/or the file write of m.exe
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the file create event for m.exe into the System32 folder. MVISION Endpoint would have blocked the malicious script thanks to a signature-based detection for code being executed in a PowerShell session. [1]
14.B.4
Dumped plaintext credentials using Mimikatz (m.exe) m.exe injecting into lsass.exe to dump credentials
Credential Dumping
(T1003)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (orange indicator) called "Credential Dumping" was generated due the suspicious indicator "Mimikatz executed a credential dumping module." [1]
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow indicator) called "Credential Dumping" was generated due the suspicious indicator "LSASS process memory read by other process." [1]
14.B.5
Encoded and wrote Mimikatz output to a WMI class property using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Set-WmiInstance
Obfuscated Files or Information
(T1027)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
14.B.6
Read and decoded Mimikatz output from a WMI class property using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-WmiInstance
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
(T1140)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
15.A.1
Enumerated logged on users using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:UserName
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
15.A.2
Established WMI event subscription persistence using PowerShell powershell.exe creating the WindowsParentalControlMigration WMI filter, consumer, and binding created in root/subscription
Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
(T1084)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow indicator) called "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription" was generated due to the Suspicious Indicator "Detected WMI event subscription." [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the WindowsParentalControlMigration WMI filter, consumer, and binding created in root/subscription. [1]
16.A.1
Enumerated the domain controller host NewYork (10.0.0.4) using LDAP queries powershell.exe making LDAP queries over port 389 via functions from System.DirectoryServices.dll
Remote System Discovery
(T1018)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though a real time search showed that the System.DirectoryServices.dll module was loaded by powershell.exe. MVISION Endpoint would have blocked this activity. [1]
16.B.1
Enumerated the domain SID (from current user SID) using the ConvertSidToStringSid API powershell.exe executing the ConvertSidToStringSid API
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
16.B.2
Executed the ConvertSidToStringSid API call by reflectively loading Advapi32.dll powershell.exe executing the ConvertSidToStringSid API function by loading Advapi32.dll
Execution through API
(T1106)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing PowerShell reflectively loading Advapi32.dll inorder to execute the ConvertSidToStringSid API function was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
16.C.1
Established a WinRM connection to the domain controller host NewYork (10.0.0.4) Network connection to NewYork (10.0.0.4) over port 5985
Windows Remote Management
(T1028)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique detection alert (orange indicator) called "Windows Remote Management" was generated for powershell.exe making a network connection to remote host NewYork (10.0.0.4) over port 5985. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a network connection to remote host NewYork (10.0.0.4) over port 5985. [1]
16.C.2
Logged on to the domain controller host NewYork (10.0.0.4) using valid credentials for user MScott  Successful logon as user MScott on NewYork (10.0.0.4)
Valid Accounts
(T1078)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a successful logon on NewYork (10.0.0.4) as user MScott. [1]
16.D.1
Dropped Mimikatz (m.exe) to disk on the domain controller host NewYork (10.0.0.4) over a WinRM connection File write of m.exe by the WinRM process (wsmprovhost.exe)
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed creation of m.exe (identified as Mimikatz by the file metadata) in the System32 directory by wsmprovhost.exe. MVISION Endpoint would have blocked the malicious file m.exe due to a cloud-based classification detected by Advanced Threat Protection signature. [1] [2]
16.D.2
Dumped the KRBTGT hash on the domain controller host NewYork (10.0.0.4) using Mimikatz (m.exe) m.exe injecting into lsass.exe to dump credentials
Credential Dumping
(T1003)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (yellow indicator) called "Credential Dumping" was generated due to the Suspicious Indicator "LSASS process memory read by other process." MVISION Endpoint would have blocked the malicious file m.exe due to a cloud-based classification detected by Advanced Threat Protection signature. [1]
General (Alert)
A General alert detection (yellow indicator) called "Credential Access" was generated for m.exe injecting code into a foreign process. MVISION Endpoint would have blocked the malicious file m.exe due to a cloud-based classification detected by Advanced Threat Protection signature. [1]
17.A.1
Dumped messages from the local Outlook inbox using PowerShell outlook.exe spawning from svchost.exe or powershell.exe
Email Collection
(T1114)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed outlook.exe spawning from svchost.exe, which is indicative of programmatic access to Outlook emails. [1]
17.B.1
Read and collected a local file using PowerShell powershell.exe reading the file MITRE-ATTACK-EVALS.HTML
Data from Local System
(T1005)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
17.B.2
Staged collected file into directory using PowerShell powershell.exe creating the file \WindowsParentalControlMigration\MITRE-ATTACK-EVALS.HTML
Data Staged
(T1074)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
17.C.1
Compressed a staging directory using PowerShell powershell.exe executing the ZipFile.CreateFromDirectory .NET method
Data Compressed
(T1002)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
17.C.2
Prepended the GIF file header to a compressed staging file using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Set-Content
Obfuscated Files or Information
(T1027)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the script containing the variables in scope was manually recovered from the system by the analyst, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
18.A.1
Mapped a network drive to an online OneDrive account using PowerShell net.exe with command-line arguments then making a network connection to a public IP over port 443
Web Service
(T1102)
Tactic (Alert)
A Tactic alert detection (yellow indicator) called "Collection" was generated for net.exe having active network connections. [1]
General
A General detection was generated for a socket opened by a "process that commonly does not do it". [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed net.exe with command-line arguments to connect to a OneDrive URL as well as net.exe subsequently making a network connection to public IPs over port 443. [1]
18.A.2
Exfiltrated staged collection to an online OneDrive account using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Copy-Item pointing to drive mapped to an attack-controlled OneDrive account
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
(T1048)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
19.A.1
Deleted Mimikatz (m.exe) on disk using SDelete File delete event for C:\Windows\System32\m.exe
File Deletion
(T1107)