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F-Secure: All Results Tactic Page Information

The ATT&CK All Results page displays the procedures, tested techniques, and detection results for all steps in an evaluation. The Procedure column contains a description of how the technique in the corresponding technique column was tested. The Step column is where in the operational flow the procedure occurred. Click the Step Number to view it in the Operational Flow panel. Detections are classified by one or more Detection Types, summarized by the Detection Notes, and may be supported by Screenshots. The Operational Flow panel provides the context around when a procedure was executed by showing all steps of the evaluation, including the tactics, techniques and procedures of the executed steps.

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Overview Matrix JSON Legend
Legend
Main Detection Categories: Detection Modifiers:

None

Telemetry

Indicator of
Compromise

General
Behavior

MSSP

General

Tactic

Specific
Behavior

Technique

Enrichment

Tainted

Alert

Correlated

Delayed

Host
Interrogation

Residual
Artifact

Configuration
Change

Innovative
Step
Procedures Criteria
Technique
Detection Type Detection Notes
1.A.1
User Pam executed payload rcs.3aka3.doc The rcs.3aka3.doc process spawning from explorer.exe
User Execution
(T1204)
General (Alert)
A General alert detection (low severity) was generated for rcs.3aka3.doc being identified as a "rare process executed." [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of user Pam executing rcs.3aka3.doc. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed explorer.exe executing rcs.3aka3.doc. [1]
1.A.2
Used unicode right-to-left override (RTLO) character to obfuscate file name rcs.3aka3.doc (originally cod.3aka.scr) Evidence of the right-to-left override character (U+202E) in the rcs.3aka.doc process ​OR the original filename (cod.3aka.scr)
Masquerading
(T1036)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred showing the original filename:​ cod.3aka.scr. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a process "?cod.3aka" with filename "rcs.3aka.doc", indicative of masquerading. [1]
1.A.3
Established C2 channel (192.168.0.5) via rcs.3aka3.doc payload over TCP port 1234 Established network channel over port 1234
Uncommonly Used Port
(T1065)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of cod.3aka3.scr connecting to 192.168.0.5 on port 1234. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a network connection to 192.168.0.5 over port 1234. [1]
1.A.4
Used RC4 stream cipher to encrypt C2 (192.168.0.5) traffic Evidence that the network data sent over the C2 channel is encrypted
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
(T1032)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though data showed rcs.3aka3.doc loading cryptographic libraries. [1]
1.B.1
Spawned interactive cmd.exe cmd.exe spawning from the rcs.3aka3.doc​ process
Command-Line Interface
(T1059)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for an anomalous script occurred containing evidence of cmd spawning from rcs.3aka3.doc​. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed cmd.exe spawning from rcs.3aka3.doc. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for Abnormal File Modification. [1] [2]
1.B.2
Spawned interactive powershell.exe powershell.exe spawning from cmd.exe
PowerShell
(T1086)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed powershell.exe spawning from cmd.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for Abnormal Process. [1] [2]
2.A.1
Searched filesystem for document and media files using PowerShell  powershell.exe executing (Get-)ChildItem
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of the Childitem cmdlet. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the execution of ChildItem. [1]
2.A.2
Scripted search of filesystem for document and media files using PowerShell  powershell.exe executing (Get-)ChildItem
Automated Collection
(T1119)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of the Childitem. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the execution of the ChildItem. [1]
2.A.3
Recursively collected files found in C:\Users\Pam\ using PowerShell powershell.exe reading files in C:\Users\Pam\
Data from Local System
(T1005)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
2.A.4
Compressed and stored files into ZIP (Draft.zip) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Compress-Archive
Data Compressed
(T1002)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of the Compress-Archive cmdlet being executed. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe compressing via Compress-Archive. [1]
2.A.5
Staged files for exfiltration into ZIP (Draft.zip) using PowerShell powershell.exe creating the file draft.zip
Data Staged
(T1074)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed file creation of Draft.zip. [1]
2.B.1
Read and downloaded ZIP (Draft.zip) over C2 channel (192.168.0.5 over TCP port 1234) The rcs.3aka3.doc process reading the file draft.zip while connected to the C2 channel
Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel
(T1041)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
3.A.1
Dropped stage 2 payload (monkey.png) to disk The rcs.3aka3.doc process creating the file monkey.png
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
General (Alert, Correlated)
A General alert detection (informational) was generated due to a suspicious download by PowerShell. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for Abnormal File Modification. [1]
3.A.2
Embedded PowerShell payload in monkey.png using steganography Evidence that a PowerShell payload was within monkey.png
Obfuscated Files or Information
(T1027)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of a PowerShell script contained within monkey.png. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed PowerShell extracting and executing the code embedded within monkey.png. [1] [2]
3.B.1
Modified the Registry to enable COM hijacking of sdclt.exe using PowerShell Addition of the DelegateExecute ​subkey in ​HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\​​command​​
Component Object Model Hijacking
(T1122)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of the addition of the DelegateExecute Registry Value. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a Registry write of the command subkey. [1]
3.B.2
Executed elevated PowerShell payload High integrity powershell.exe spawning from control.exe​​ (spawned from sdclt.exe)
Bypass User Account Control
(T1088)
General (Alert)
A General alert detection (high severity) was generated due to powershell.exe running with parameters associated with post exploitation payloads. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred for User DMEVALS\pam launching a command prompt from which the sdclt.exe program was used. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed control.exe creating a high integrity powershell.exe. [1]
3.B.3
Established C2 channel (192.168.0.5) via PowerShell payload over TCP port 443 Established network channel over port 443
Commonly Used Port
(T1043)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe connecting to 192.168.0.5 on port 443. [1]
3.B.4
Used HTTPS to transport C2 (192.168.0.5) traffic Evidence that the network data sent over the C2 channel is HTTPS
Standard Application Layer Protocol
(T1071)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed PowerShell process exchanging data over HTTPS. [1]
3.B.5
Used HTTPS to encrypt C2 (192.168.0.5) traffic Evidence that the network data sent over the C2 channel is encrypted
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
(T1032)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed PowerShell process exchanging data over HTTPS. [1]
3.C.1
Modified the Registry to remove artifacts of COM hijacking Deletion of of the HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\Open\command subkey
Modify Registry
(T1112)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred for the recursive deletion of the registry key. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed PowerShell command to remove DelegateExecute Registry Value. [1]
4.A.1
Dropped additional tools (SysinternalsSuite.zip) to disk over C2 channel (192.168.0.5) powershell.exe creating the file SysinternalsSuite.zip
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
General (Alert)
A General alert detection (low severity) was generated for PowerShell downloading a significant amount of data using HTTP(S). [1]
4.A.2
Spawned interactive powershell.exe powershell.exe spawning from powershell.exe
PowerShell
(T1086)
Technique (Alert, Correlated)
A Technique alert detection for PowerShell (medium severity) was generated due to a suspicious PowerShell command. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for a suspicious download by PowerShell. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed a new powershell.exe spawning from powershell.exe. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for a suspicious download by PowerShell. [1]
4.A.3
Decompressed ZIP (SysinternalsSuite.zip) file using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Expand-Archive
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
(T1140)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell unzipping and moving SysInternals tools. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed PowerShell decompressing the ZIP via Expand-Archive and corresponding file writes. [1] [2]
4.B.1
Enumerated current running processes using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-Process
Process Discovery
(T1057)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing Get-Process. [1]
4.B.2
Deleted rcs.3aka3.doc on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file rcs.3aka3.doc
File Deletion
(T1107)
Technique (Alert, Correlated)
A Technique alert detection for file deletion (medium severity) was generated due to sdelete64.exe deleting rcs.3aka3.doc. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for PowerShell. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of sdelete64.exe deleting rcs.3aka3.doc. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed sdelete64.exe deleting rcs.3aka3.doc. [1]
4.B.3
Deleted Draft.zip on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file draft.zip
File Deletion
(T1107)
Technique (Alert, Correlated)
A Technique alert detection for file deletion (medium severity) was generated due to sdelete64.exe deleting Draft.Zip. The detection was correlated to a parent alert for PowerShell. [1] [2]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of sdelete64.exe deleting Draft.zip [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed sdelete64.exe deleting Draft.zip. [1]
4.B.4
Deleted SysinternalsSuite.zip on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file SysinternalsSuite.zip
File Deletion
(T1107)
Technique (Alert, Correlated)
A Technique alert detection (medium severity) for file deletion was generated due to sdelete64.exe deleting SysinternalsSuite.zip. This was correlated to a previous detection for PowerShell. [1] [2]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of sdelete64.exe deleting SysinternalsSuite.zip [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed sdelete64.exe deleting SysinternalsSuite.zip. [1]
4.C.1
Enumerated user's temporary directory path using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:TEMP
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing $env:TEMP. [1]
4.C.2
Enumerated the current username using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:USERNAME
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing $env:USERNAME. [1]
4.C.3
Enumerated the computer hostname using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:COMPUTERNAME
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing $env:COMPUTERNAME. [1]
4.C.4
Enumerated the current domain name using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $env:USERDOMAIN
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing $env:USERDOMAIN. [1]
4.C.5
Enumerated the current process ID using PowerShell powershell.exe executing $PID
Process Discovery
(T1057)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing $PID. [1]
4.C.6
Enumerated the OS version using PowerShell powershell.exe executing​ Gwmi Win32_OperatingSystem
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection for "wmi-enumerating-os" was generated due to a WMI query for OS version. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing:​ Gwmi Win32_OperatingSystem [1]
4.C.7
Enumerated anti-virus software using PowerShell powershell.exe executing​ Get-WmiObject ...​ -Class AntiVirusProduct
Security Software Discovery
(T1063)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection labeled wmi-enumeration-av was generated due to a WMI query for AntivirusProduct. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing:​ Get-WmiObject ...​ -Class AntiVirusProduct [1]
4.C.8
Enumerated firewall software using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-WmiObject ...​​ -Class FireWallProduct
Security Software Discovery
(T1063)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection was generated for WMI being used to query information about firewall products. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing: Get-WmiObject ...​​ -Class FireWallProduct [1]
4.C.9
Enumerated user's domain group membership via the NetUserGetGroups API powershell.exe executing the NetUserGetGroups API
Permission Groups Discovery
(T1069)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the NetUserGetGroups API call. [1]
4.C.10
Executed API call by reflectively loading Netapi32.dll The NetUserGetGroups API function loaded into powershell.exe from Netapi32.dll
Execution through API
(T1106)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the NetUserGetGroups API function from Netapi32.dll. [1]
4.C.11
Enumerated user's local group membership via the NetUserGetLocalGroups API powershell.exe executing the NetUserGetLocalGroups API
Permission Groups Discovery
(T1069)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the NetUserGetLocalGroups API call. [1]
4.C.12
Executed API call by reflectively loading Netapi32.dll The NetUserGetLocalGroups API function loaded into powershelle.exe from Netapi32.dll
Execution through API
(T1106)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the NetUserGetLocalGroups API function from Netapi32.dll. [1]
5.A.1
Created a new service (javamtsup) that executes a service binary (javamtsup.exe) at system startup powershell.exe creating the Javamtsup service
New Service
(T1050)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection for Create New Service occurred containing evidence of the javamtsup service being installed. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a registry event and service creation of javamtsup. [1] [2]
5.B.1
Created a LNK file (hostui.lnk) in the Startup folder that executes on login powershell.exe creating the file hostui.lnk in the Startup folder
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
(T1060)
General (Correlated, Alert)
A General alert detection (low severity) was generated for a shortcut file (hostui.lnk) being modified. The event was correlated to a parent alert for suspicious powershell. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of the creation of the hostui.lnk file in the Startup folder. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed Startup folder registry modification for hostui.lnk. [1]
6.A.1
Read the Chrome SQL database file to extract encrypted credentials accesschk.exe reading files within %APPDATALOCAL%\Google\chrome\user data\default\
Credentials in Files
(T1081)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
6.A.2
Executed the CryptUnprotectedData API call to decrypt Chrome passwords accesschk.exe executing the CryptUnprotectedData API
Credential Dumping
(T1003)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
6.A.3
Masqueraded a Chrome password dump tool as accesscheck.exe, a legitimate Sysinternals tool Evidence that accesschk.exe is not the legitimate Sysinternals tool
Masquerading
(T1036)
General (Alert)
A General alert detection (medium severity) was generated identifying accesschk.exe as potentially unwanted application (PUA). This indicates that the file is not the legitimate Sysinternals tool. [1]
6.B.1
Exported a local certificate to a PFX file using PowerShell powershell.exe creating a certificate file exported from the system
Private Keys
(T1145)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the Master File Table (MFT) was manually pulled in order to locate the written pfx private key file. [1]
6.C.1
Dumped password hashes from the Windows Registry by injecting a malicious DLL into Lsass.exe powershell.exe injecting into lsass.exe OR lsass.exe reading Registry keys under HKLM:\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\
Credential Dumping
(T1003)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (medium severity) for a possible LSASS memory dump was generated due powershell.exe opening handles to lsass.exe in a pattern that happens when a minidump of a process is generated. [1]
7.A.1
Captured and saved screenshots using PowerShell powershell.exe executing the CopyFromScreen function from System.Drawing.dll
Screen Capture
(T1113)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell taking screenshots. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing CopyFromScreen from System.Drawing.dll. [1]
7.A.2
Captured clipboard contents using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-Clipboard
Clipboard Data
(T1115)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing Get-Clipboard. [1]
7.A.3
Captured user keystrokes using the GetAsyncKeyState API powershell.exe executing the GetAsyncKeyState API
Input Capture
(T1056)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection called dotnet-keylogging (medium severity) was generated for use of the GetAsyncKeyState API. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed PowerShell calling the GetAsyncKeyState API. [1]
7.B.1
Read data in the user's Downloads directory using PowerShell powershell.exe reading files in C:\Users\pam\Downloads\
Data from Local System
(T1005)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
7.B.2
Compressed data from the user's Downloads directory into a ZIP file (OfficeSupplies.7z) using PowerShell powershell.exe creating the file OfficeSupplies.7z
Data Compressed
(T1002)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
7.B.3
Encrypted data from the user's Downloads directory using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Compress-7Zip with the password argument used for encryption
Data Encrypted
(T1022)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell compressing and encrypting contents of the downloads folder. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing Compress-7Zip with arguments for encryption. [1]
7.B.4
Exfiltrated collection (OfficeSupplies.7z) to WebDAV network share using PowerShell powershell executing Copy-Item pointing to an attack-controlled WebDav network share (192.168.0.4:80)
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
(T1048)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PoweShell Copy-Item to remote WebDav network share (192.168.0.4) [1] [2]
8.A.1
Enumerated remote systems using LDAP queries powershell.exe making LDAP queries over port 389 to the Domain Controller (10.0.0.4)
Remote System Discovery
(T1018)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe establishing a connection to NewYork (10.0.0.4) over TCP port 389. [1] [2]
8.A.2
Established WinRM connection to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) Network connection to Scranton (10.0.1.4) over port 5985
Windows Remote Management
(T1028)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (medium severity) was generated due to PowerShell using WinRM. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing Invoke-Command and connected to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) over port 5985. [1] [2]
8.A.3
Enumerated processes on remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing Get-Process
Process Discovery
(T1057)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell being used to get process information from the remote system Scranton. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing Get-Process. [1]
8.B.1
Copied python.exe payload from a WebDAV share (192.168.0.4) to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) The file python.exe created on Scranton (10.0.1.4)
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence that python.exe was copied to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4). [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a file create event of python.exe. [1]
8.B.2
python.exe payload was packed with UPX Evidence that the file python.exe is packed
Software Packing
(T1045)
None (Host Interrogation, Delayed (Manual))
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though the analyst was able to retrieve the file, and demonstrate that it is UPX packed, so it is identified as Host Interrogation. [1]
8.C.1
Logged on to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4) using valid credentials for user Pam Successful logon as user Pam on Scranton (10.0.1.4)
Valid Accounts
(T1078)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of a valid logon on Scranton (10.0.1.4) as user Pam. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a valid logon on Scranton (10.0.1.4) as user Pam. [1]
8.C.2
Established SMB session to remote host Scranton's (10.0.1.4) IPC$ share using PsExec SMB session to Scanton (10.0.1.4) over TCP port 445/135 OR evidence of usage of a Windows share
Windows Admin Shares
(T1077)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed an SMB session from Nashua (10.0.1.6) to Scranton (10.0.1.4) over TCP port 135. [1]
8.C.3
Executed python.exe using PSExec python.exe spawned by PSEXESVC.exe
Service Execution
(T1035)
Technique (Alert, Correlated)
A Technique alert detection (low severity) for "Service Execution" was generated due to PsExec running a process remotely. The event was correlated to parent alert for Abnormal File Modification. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PSEXESVC.exe executing python.exe. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed python.exe spawned by PSEXESVC.exe. [1]
9.A.1
Dropped rar.exe to disk on remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4)  python.exe creating the file rar.exe
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence that rar.exe was copied to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4). [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed FILE_CREATE event for python.exe creating rar.exe. [1]
9.A.2
Dropped sdelete.exe to disk on remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4)  python.exe creating the file sdelete64.exe
Remote File Copy
(T1105)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence that sdelete.exe was copied to remote host Scranton (10.0.1.4). [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed FILE_CREATE event for python.exe creating sdelete64.exe. [1]
9.B.1
Spawned interactive powershell.exe powershell.exe​ spawning from python.exe
PowerShell
(T1086)
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed python.exe executing powershell.exe. This event was correlated to prior detection for the python.exe process. [1]
9.B.2
Searched filesystem for document and media files using PowerShell powershell.exe executing (Get-)ChildItem​
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell executing ChildItem to search the file system. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing ChildItem. [1]
9.B.3
Scripted search of filesystem for document and media files using PowerShell  powershell.exe executing (Get-)ChildItem​
Automated Collection
(T1119)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell executing ChildItem to search the file system. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing ChildItem. [1]
9.B.4
Recursively collected files found in C:\Users\Pam\ using PowerShell powershell.exe reading files in C:\Users\Pam\
Data from Local System
(T1005)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
9.B.5
Staged files for exfiltration into ZIP (working.zip in AppData directory) using PowerShell powershell.exe creating the file working.zip
Data Staged
(T1074)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell staging files into working.zip. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a FILE_CREATE event for powershell.exe creating working.zip. [1]
9.B.6
Encrypted staged ZIP (working.zip in AppData directory) into working.zip (on Desktop) using rar.exe powershell.exe executing rar.exe with the -a parameter for a password to use for encryption
Data Encrypted
(T1022)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence that rar.exe was used to compress and encrypt working.zip. [1] [2]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing rar.exe with command-line arguments. This event was correlated to a previous detection for Abnormal File Modification. [1]
9.B.7
Compressed staged ZIP (working.zip in AppData directory) into working.zip (on Desktop) using rar.exe powershell.exe executing rar.exe
Data Compressed
(T1002)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence that rar.exe was used to compress and encrypt working.zip. [1] [2]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing rar.exe with command-line arguments. This event was correlated to a previous detection for Abnormal File Modification. [1] [2]
9.B.8
Read and downloaded ZIP (working.zip on Desktop) over C2 channel (192.168.0.5 over TCP port 8443) python.exe reading the file working.zip while connected to the C2 channel
Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel
(T1041)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though data showed a connection to TCP port 8443. [1]
9.C.1
Deleted rar.exe on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file rar.exe
File Deletion
(T1107)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (medium severity) for "Sdelete file removal" was generated when sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments was used to delete rar.exe. [1]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments to delete rar.exe. The event was correlated to a Technique detection on python.exe. [1]
9.C.2
Deleted working.zip (from Desktop) on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file \Desktop\working.zip
File Deletion
(T1107)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (medium severity) for "Sdelete file removal" was generated when sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments was used to delete rar.exe. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of sdelete deleting Desktop\working.zip. [1] [2]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments to delete Desktop\working.zip. The event was correlated to a Technique detection on python.exe. [1]
9.C.3
Deleted working.zip (from AppData directory) on disk using SDelete sdelete64.exe deleting the file \AppData\Roaming\working.zip
File Deletion
(T1107)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (medium severity) for "Sdelete file removal" was generated when sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments was used to delete rar.exe. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of sdelete deleting Roaming\working.zip. [1] [2]
Telemetry (Correlated)
Telemetry showed sdelete64.exe with command-line arguments to delete Roaming\working.zip. The event was correlated to a Technique detection on python.exe. [1]
9.C.4
Deleted SDelete on disk using cmd.exe del command cmd.exe deleting the file sdelete64.exe
File Deletion
(T1107)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of the deletion of sdelete.exe. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the file deletion of sdelete64.exe. [1]
10.A.1
Executed persistent service (javamtsup) on system startup javamtsup.exe spawning from services.exe
Service Execution
(T1035)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
10.B.1
Executed LNK payload (hostui.lnk) in Startup Folder on user login Evidence that the file hostui.lnk (which executes hostui.bat as a byproduct) was executed from the Startup Folder
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
(T1060)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
10.B.2
Executed PowerShell payload via the CreateProcessWithToken API hostui.exe executing the CreateProcessWithToken API
Execution through API
(T1106)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure, though data showed svchost.exe with -seclogon flag spawning before PowerShell. [1]
10.B.3
Manipulated the token of the PowerShell payload via the CreateProcessWithToken API hostui.exe manipulating the token of powershell.exe via the CreateProcessWithToken API OR powershell.exe executing with the stolen token of explorer.exe
Access Token Manipulation
(T1134)
None
No detection capability demonstrated for this procedure.
11.A.1
User Oscar executed payload 37486-the-shocking-truth-about-election-rigging-in-america.rtf.lnk powershell.exe spawning from explorer.exe
User Execution
(T1204)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence user Oscar executed 37486-the-shockingtruth-about-election-rigging-in-america.rtf.lnk. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed explorer.exe executing powershell.exe. [1]
11.A.2
Executed an alternate data stream (ADS) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing the schemas ADS via Get-Content and IEX
NTFS File Attributes
(T1096)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (high severity) was generated due to PowerShell running a script from an ADS. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell executing schemas ADS via Get-Content and IEX. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe executing the schemas ADS with Get-Content and IEX. [1]
11.A.3
Checked that the BIOS version and serial number are not associated with VirtualBox or VMware using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_BIOS
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
(T1497)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell gwmi query for Win32_BIOS. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the PowerShell gwmi query for Win32_BIOS. [1]
11.A.4
Enumerated computer manufacturer, model, and version information using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject gwmi queries for Win32_BIOS and Win32_ComputerSystem
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell gwmi queries for Win32_BIOS and Win32_ComputerSystem. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the PowerShell gwmi queries for Win32_BIOS and Win32_ComputerSystem. [1]
11.A.5
Enumerated devices/adapters to check for presence of VirtualBox driver(s) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_PnPEntity
Peripheral Device Discovery
(T1120)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell gwmi query for Win32_PnPEntity. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the PowerShell gwmi query for Win32_PnPEntity. [1]
11.A.6
Checked that the username is not related to admin or a generic value (ex: user) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_ComputerSystem
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell gwmi query for Win32_ComputerSystem. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the PowerShell gwmi query for Win32_ComputerSystem. [1]
11.A.7
Checked that the computer is joined to a domain using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_ComputerSystem
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell gwmi query for Win32_ComputerSystem. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe gwmi query for Win32_ComputerSystem. [1]
11.A.8
Checked that processes such as procexp.exe, taskmgr.exe, or wireshark.exe are not running using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for Win32_Process
Process Discovery
(T1057)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell gwmi query for Win32_Process. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the PowerShell gwmi query for Win32_Process. [1]
11.A.9
Checked that the payload is not inside a folder path that contains "sample" or is the length of a hash value using PowerShell powershell.exe executing (Get-Item -Path ".\" -Verbose).FullName
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed PowerShell executing Get-Item for the current path. [1]
11.A.10
Decoded an embedded DLL payload to disk using certutil.exe certutil.exe decoding kxwn.lock
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
(T1140)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (medium severity) was generated for certutil with decode switch usage. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP occurred containing evidence of certutil.exe decoding kxwn.lock. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the certutil.exe process and corresponding file write of the kxwn.lock payload. [1]
11.A.11
Established Registry Run key persistence using PowerShell Addition of the Webcache subkey in HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
(T1060)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (high severity) was generated for a detected process performing a Registry write that looks like a launchpoint. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of the creation of a registry value named "Webcache." [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed a Registry write event of the Webcache subkey identified as an Autorun. [1]
11.A.12
Executed PowerShell stager payload powershell.exe spawning from from the schemas ADS (powershell.exe)
PowerShell
(T1086)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (high severity) for a Powershell script launched from ads was generated due to a PowerShell script launched from an ADS. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe spawned from a PowerShell stager. [1]
11.A.13
Established C2 channel (192.168.0.4) via PowerShell payload over port 443 Established network channel over port 443
Commonly Used Port
(T1043)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP occurred containing evidence of a connection back to the C2 server 192.168.0.4 over port 443. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed powershell.exe making a network connection to the C2 (192.168.0.4) over port 443. [1]
11.A.14
Used HTTPS to transport C2 (192.168.0.4) traffic Established network channel over the HTTPS protocol
Standard Application Layer Protocol
(T1071)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed PowerShell making network connection to C2 (192.168.0.4) over HTTPS. [1]
11.A.15
Used HTTPS to encrypt C2 (192.168.0.4) traffic Evidence that the network data sent over the C2 channel is encrypted
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
(T1032)
Telemetry
Telemetry showed PowerShell making network connection to C2 (192.168.0.4) over HTTPS. [1]
12.A.1
Enumerated the System32 directory using PowerShell powershell.exe executing (gci ((gci env:windir).Value + '\system32')
File and Directory Discovery
(T1083)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell enumeration of System32. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the PowerShell enumeration of the System32 directory. [1]
12.A.2
Modified the time attributes of the kxwn.lock persistence payload using PowerShell powershell.exe modifying the creation, last access, and last write times of kxwn.lock
Timestomp
(T1099)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of the Powershell function "timestomp" being called to modify the creation time of kxwn.lock. [1]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the LastWriteTime of kxwn.lock being accessed. [1]
12.B.1
Enumerated registered AV products using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Get-WmiObject query for AntiVirusProduct
Security Software Discovery
(T1063)
Technique (Alert)
A Technique alert detection (informational severity) was generated for for WMI querying information about anti-virus products. [1]
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell gwmi query for AntiVirusProduct. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed PowerShell gwmi query for AntiVirusProduct [1]
12.C.1
Enumerated installed software via the Registry (Wow6432 Uninstall key) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Registry query for HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall
Query Registry
(T1012)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of Powershell functions which queried the WMI security centre class and also the software uninstall registry keys. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed script block with registry query for installed software. [1] [2]
12.C.2
Enumerated installed software via the Registry (Uninstall key) using PowerShell powershell.exe executing a Registry query for HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall
Query Registry
(T1012)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of Powershell functions which queried the WMI security centre class and also the software uninstall registry keys. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed script block with registry query for installed software. [1]
13.A.1
Enumerated the computer name using the GetComputerNameEx API powershell.exe executing the GetComputerNameEx API
System Information Discovery
(T1082)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell calling the GetComputerNameEx API. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed PowerShell calling the GetComputerNameEx API. [1]
13.B.1
Enumerated the domain name using the NetWkstaGetInfo API powershell.exe executing the NetWkstaGetInfo API
System Network Configuration Discovery
(T1016)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell calling the NetWkstaGetInfo API. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the NetWkstaGetInfo API call. [1]
13.C.1
Enumerated the current username using the GetUserNameEx API powershell.exe executing the GetUserNameEx API
System Owner/User Discovery
(T1033)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell calling the GetUserNameEx API. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the GetUserNameEx API call. [1]
13.D.1
Enumerated running processes using the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot API powershell.exe executing the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot API
Process Discovery
(T1057)
MSSP (Delayed (Manual))
An MSSP detection occurred containing evidence of PowerShell calling the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot API. [1] [2]
Telemetry
Telemetry showed the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot API call. [1]
14.A.1
Modified the Registry to enable COM hijacking of sdclt.exe using PowerShell Addition of the DelegateExecute subkey in HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command
Component Object Model Hijacking
(T1122)